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Abstract. We present a technique to enhance the security of Goldreich, Goldwasser
and Halevi (GGH) scheme. The security of GGH has practically been broken by lattice
reduction techniques. Those attacks are successful due to the structure of the basis used in
the secret key. In this work, we aim to present a new technique to alleviate this problem
by modifying the public key which hides the structure of the corresponding private key.
We intersect the initial lattice with a random one while keeping the initial lattice as our
secret key and use the corresponding result of the intersection as the public key. We show
sufficient evidence that this technique will make GGH implementations secure against the
aforementioned attacks.
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1 Introduction
The popularity of post-quantum cryptography has increased significantly after
the formal announcement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to move away from classical cryptography [58]. This is due to the poten-
tial threat that will be brought by the upcoming large scale quantum computers,
which theoritically break the underlying traditional hard problem by using Shor’s
algorithm [71]. There are currently three main families in post-quantum cryp-
tology, namely code-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, and lattice-
based cryptography. This work primarily concerns with lattice-based cryptogra-
phy. First introduced by Minkowski in a pioneering work [53] to solve various
number problems, lattices have the advantage to often base their security on worst-
case assumptions [1] rather than the average case, and to be highly parallelizable
and algorithmically simple enough to compete with traditional schemes in terms of
computing speed. Inspired by this, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH) [28]
proposed an efficient way to use lattices to build a public-key encryption scheme.
Their practical scheme has been broken using lattice reduction techniques [55],
2 A. Sipasseuth, T. Plantard and W. Susilo
however the central idea is still viable and gave birth to a wide array of applica-
tions and improvements, using tensor products [20], Hermite Normal Forms [50],
polynomial representations [60], rotations [73], etc. The idea of intersecting lat-
tices for cryptography first appeared in a broadcast attack on lattices [65], and
since then it has been used in various cryptanalytic efforts. Nevertheless, there
is no attempt that makes use of this technique in a positive way, i.e., for building
a secure cryptosystem. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring this possibility.
Our work does not follow the previous works on the LWE or SIS type problems,
which are currently very popular. Those lattices have a particular form and are
called q-ary lattices, which only represent a small fraction of all lattices. They do
benefit from Ajtai’s worst-case to average case security reduction [1], but so does
most randomly taken lattices as showed recently by Gama et al. [23]. We will
moreover focus on lattices with a Hermite Normal Form that only admits a single
dense column which belongs to the most dense set of all lattices [57]. Therefore,
our work can be seen as a continuation of the work on non q-ary following the line
of the first initial proposal of GGH [28] and Micciancio’s improvement of GGH
with Hermite Normal Forms [50], where the latter has yet to be broken asymptot-
ically. Furthermore, a lot of schemes based on LWE require Gaussian sampling
for encryption and key generation [42, 46] which is very costly and impractical
[62, 76] either in memory or in speed compared to the efficiency of more classical
lattice-based schemes or other specialized versions as NTRU [32], whose security
is also based on q−ary lattices problems. This problem is big enough to motivate
many research directions to either tackle the issue [13, 17, 18], or avoid it using
LWR (Learning with Rounding) [10] or LWE with uniform distribution [45]. In
this paper, we attempt to use a more radical option by moving away from LWE-
based cryptosystems and q-ary lattices and hope for a gain in encryption speed and
key-size efficiency. On the other hand, we do not have provable security on our
particular structure but neither does NTRU, although NTRU have been researched
intensively for quite some time now. Another motivation to follow an alternative
path of study from LWE-based cryptosystems (and q-ary lattices) is the recent pro-
gresses of attacks on such cryptosystems [3, 6, 14, 30, 39, 40], and the recent talk
given by Lyubashevsky at PKC’16 in which he also qualifies LWE-based problems
as particular instances of "basic" lattice problems and advised "to understand the
underlying knapsack problems" to build practical schemes [47].
Our Contribution and Paper Organization
The initial practical schemes of GGH have been broken mostly because of the very
specific structure of the keys used. The main idea developed in this paper is to in-
tersect the public key with a random lattice of the same rank to hide the previously
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exploited specific structure. However, we also show that improving security using
intersections is not as simple as just intersecting any key to any random lattice and
therefore we present specific choice of keys based on intersection properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the basics of lattice
theory and discuss the initial GGH scheme in Sec. 2. Then, in Sec. 3, we present
our idea to enhance its security and show that this extra layer of security does not
affect our capacity to encrypt or decrypt messages. We also explain how we com-
pute keys in practice as a lot of properties arise from intersecting lattices, which
can further be exploited to either enforce or weaken the security of the result-
ing system and more importantly we demonstrate how it hides the initial “weak"
structure. We give a short comparison in efficiency and key sizes compared to
other schemes. In Sec. 4, we discuss potential security concerns given by the
stated properties. Finally, in Sec. 5 we discuss further applications of intersecting
lattices.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly recall the basics of lattice theory.
2.1 Lattice theory
Definition 1. We call lattice a discrete subgroup of Rn where n is a positive integer.
We say a lattice is an integer lattice when it is a subgroup of Zn. A basis of the
lattice is a basis as a Z −module. If M is a matrix, we define L(M) the lattice
generated by the rows of M .
In this work we only consider full-rank integer lattices, i.e such that their basis
can be represented by a n× n non-singular integer matrix.
Theorem 1 (Determinant). For any lattice L, there exists a real value we call de-
terminant, denoted det(L), such that for any basis B, det(L) =
√
det(BBT ).
The literature sometimes call det(L) the volume of L [53].
Definition 2 (Hermite Normal Form (HNF)). Let L be an integer lattice of dimen-
sion d and H ∈ Zd,n a basis of L. H is said to be of Hermite Normal Form if
and only if
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∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ d, Hi,j

= 0 if i > j
≥ 0 if i ≤ j
< Hj,j if i < j
The HNF can be computed from any basis in polynomial time [37], is unique
[16] and has a very compressed form, and thus is an ideal form for public keys
[50]. We denote HNF(M ) the HNF of a matrix M . One of the easiest form to
work with when the HNF is computed is when we obtain a “perfect" HNF.
Definition 3. Let M be the basis of an integer lattice L of dimension n in HNF
form. As the HNF form is unique per lattice, we can writeHNF (M) = HNF (L).
We say HNF (L) has pseudo-perfect form when only one column differs from
Idn and perfect when only the first column differs.
Example 1. A has perfect form, B pseudo-perfect, and C neither of them.
A =

34 0 0 0
27 1 0 0
32 0 1 0
13 0 0 1
, B =

1 0 0 0
0 34 0 0
0 25 1 0
0 18 0 1
, C =

17 0 0 0
10 2 0 0
15 1 1 0
13 0 0 1

For consistency with the rest of the paper, we assume Idn is a perfect form
HNF.
Definition 4. Let L be a full-rank integer lattice of dimension n. We say L is
co-cyclic when Z/L is cyclic.
According to Nguyen and Shparlinski the set of co-cyclic lattices represent 85%
of full-rank integer lattices [57]. Note that if HNF (L) has perfect or pseudo-
perfect form, then L is co-cyclic.
Definition 5. We say a lattice L1 is an overlattice of L2 and L2 is a sublattice of
L1 when L2 ⊆ L1.
Thus, if L3 = L1 ∩ L2 then L3 is an sublattice to both L1 and L2.
Definition 6. We say a lattice is a diagonally dominant (DD) type lattice if it admits
a basis of the form D + R where D = d × Id, d ∈ Z, and R is a "noise" matrix
whose entries lie in [−µ, µ] where d >> µ. µ is called the bound of the noise.
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We note that the definition is a bit different to the one which can be found in
fundamental mathematics books [12]. The other definition requires the sum of
norms of non-diagonal entries in a row to be lower or equal to the norm of its di-
agonal entry in that same row (or line, depending how you consider the vectors).
Here the definition of “low" is arbitrary, but the overall idea is the same. In our
following experimentations we will restrict ourselves to d = d
√
ne where n is the
dimension, and µ = 1.
Definition 7 (Minima). We note λi(L) the i−th minimum of a lattice L. It is the
radius of the smallest zero-centered ball containing at least i linearly independant
elements of L.
Definition 8 (Lattice gap). We note δi(L) the ratio λi+1(L)λi(L) and call that a lattice
gap. When mentioned without index and called "the" gap, the index is implied to
be i = 1.
We also define the “root lattice gap", i.e., elevated to the power 1n where n is
the dimension of the lattice.
2.2 Lattice problems
The most famous problems on lattice are the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and
the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). We tend to approximatively solve CVP by
solving heuristically SVP in an expanded lattice [28].
Definition 9 (CVP: Closest Vector Problem). Given a basis B of a lattice L of
dimension n and t ∈ Rn, find v ∈ L such that ∀w ∈ L, ‖t− v‖ ≤ ‖t− w‖.
Definition 10 (SVP: Shortest Vector Problem). Given a basis B of a lattice L
of dimension n, find v ∈ L such that ∀w ∈ L, v 6= w, ‖v‖ ≤ ‖w − v‖, i.e
‖v‖ = λ1(B).
In cryptography, we rely on the “easier" versions of those problems:
Definition 11 (uSVPδ: δ-unique Shortest Vector Problem). Given a basis of a lat-
tice L with its lattice gap δ > 1, solve SVP.
Since λ1(L) is also hard to determine (it is indeed another lattice problem we
do not state here), measuring the efficiency of an algorithm is another challenge
by itself. Therefore, to measure algorithm efficiency we must be able to define a
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problem with easily computable parameters, which is where the Hermite factor is
originated from:
Definition 12 (HSVPγ : γ-Hermite Shortest Vector Problem). Given a basis B of
a lattice L of dimension n and a factor γ we call Hermite Factor, find y ∈ L such
that ‖y‖ ≤ γdet(L)1/n.
Some cryptosystems are based on worst-case hardness on uSVP with polyno-
mial gap as [2] and [67]. The practical hardness of uSVP depends on its gap
compared to a fraction of the Hermite factor, where the constant in front of the
factor depends of the lattice and the algorithm used [24]. There exists an attack
that was specifically built to exploit high gaps [44].
Definition 13 (BDDγ : γ-Bounded Distance Decoding). Given a basis B of a
lattice L, a point x and a approximation factor γ such that ∃v ∈ L such that
‖x− v‖ < γλ1(B) find v ∈ L such that ∀w ∈ L, ‖x− v‖ ≤ ‖x− w‖.
It has been proved that BDD1/(2γ) reduces itself to uSVPγ in polynomial time
and the same goes from uSVPγ to BDD1/γ when γ is polynomially bounded by
n [48], in cryptography the gap is polynomial the target point x must be poly-
nomially bounded therefore solving one or the other is relatively the same in our
case.
2.3 The GGH cryptosystem
GGH is a public key cryptosystem named after its creators (Goldreich, Goldwasser
and Halevi). Like every public key encryption scheme, GGH is composed of three
algorithms, namely a key generator, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption
algorithm:
• KeyGen(n). Take a “good" basis Sk of a lattice L of dimension n, compute
a "bad" basis Pk from L(Sk) and provide Pk as the public key and keep Sk
as the secret key.
• Encrypt(Pk,m). Use Pk to encrypt a message m which is a "small" vector,
less than half the size of the smallest vector of Sk, by adding a random vector
v of L. Outputs c = m+ v.
• Decrypt(Sk,c). Use Sk to decrypt a message, solving the BDD instance of
c on L(Pk) thus separating m from v and thus recovering m.
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To be able to decrypt m has to be relatively short, say ||m|| / γ thus solving
special instances of BDDγ . For this cryptosystem to be relevant, it must rely on
three important points:
• It is easy to encrypt a message with a public key. (Generate c given (Pk,m))
• It is easy to decrypt a message with a secret key (i.e., solve BDDγ with Sk).
• It is hard to recover the secret key/original message from the public key.
The first point is pretty straightforward, and the second is guaranteed only by a
proper key generation, which is where the concepts of “good basis" and “bad ba-
sis" are originated from. Sk is typically a diagonal dominant matrix, and Pk its
Hermite Normal Form. Because v is generated from Pk and L(Pk) = L(Sk), we
can then recover v from c and thus m by solving BDDγ with the "good" basis Sk
(typically composed of short and nearly orthogonal vectors). The problem stems
from the third point.
2.4 Attacks on Classical GGH
Message attacks and basis reduction on semi-orthogonal basis
The original GGH challenges [27] used an error vector whose entries are drawn
in {−σ, σ}, which allowed Nguyen to easily retrieve messages in high dimension
[55]. Using entries from [−σ, σ] fixes the problem, but the structure present in
secret keys were still exploitable. Basis reduction techniques allowed Gama and
Nguyen to recover very good basis from structural weaknesses within L(Pk) [24],
comparing them to semi-orthogonal bases.
Special Key Recovery attack on diagonal dominant keys
For diagonally dominant keys of the form Sk = D + R where D = d ∗ Id, it is
easier to attack the basis structure rather than the message itself.
Solving BDDγ for vectors (d, 0, ..., 0), (0, d, 0, ..., 0), ..., (0, ..., 0, d) in L(d ∗
Id+R) = L(Sk) = L(Pk) to recover R yields very short vectors R[1], ..., R[n]
and thus recover the secret key: the difference between the i-th vector of the matrix
d ∗ Id and L(d ∗ Id+R) is exactly the i-th vector of R, which holds small values
within [−µ, µ] and is much shorter than a message. We will denote φ the BDDγ
solving algorithm. It is not an oracle, but rather an algorithm that anybody could
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choose to solve the problem. Our suggestion for φ would be to use Kannan’s em-
bedding technique [36] which transforms the BDD instance into a uSVPγ instance,
and then apply lattice reduction techniques on the extended basis, use Klein’a al-
gorithm [41] or more recent works as Liu and Nguyen enumeration-based solver
[43]
Input: Pk the public key of full rank n, d the diagonal coefficient, φ a
BDDγ solver
Output: Sk the secret key
Sk ← d ∗ Idn;
// Loop on every position of the diagonal
foreach {i ∈ [1..n]} do
// Find r the difference between (0, ..., di, ..., 0) and L(Pk)
r ← φ(L(Pk), Sk[i]);
Sk[i]← Sk[i] + r;
end
return Sk
Algorithm 1: Diagonal Dominant Key recovery attack
Note that on the above algorithm, each iteration on a position of the diagonal
makes the next iteration easier: since L(Pk) = L(Sk), each short vector found of
Sk decreases the complexity of φ. In fact, like most lattice-based cryptosystems,
finding one shortest vector is enough to break GGH.
3 Enhanced GGH Cryptosystem
3.1 Modification of GGH using an intersecting lattice
If we denote Pk the public key and Sk our private key, our modification is to go
from L(Pk) = L(Sk) to L(Pk) = L(Sk) ∩ L(R) where R is a random non-
singular integer matrix of dimension n. The modified GGH scheme, informally,
is:
• KeyGen2(n). Take a “good" basis Sk = (D∗Idn)+([−µ, µ]n∗n) of dimen-
sion n, compute the HNF basis Pk of L(Sk) ∩ L(R) where R is a random
integral matrix of dimension n with a perfect HNF with a determinant co-
prime to Sk and provide Pk as the public key and keep Sk as the secret
key.
• Encrypt2(Pk,m). Use Pk to encrypt a message m encoded in a small
vector, by adding a random vector v of L(Pk). Outputs c = m+ v.
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• Decrypt2(Sk, c). Use Sk to decrypt a message the same way as in a classical
GGH, separating m from v by solving the corresponding BDD instance and
thus recovering m.
The secret key in our experiments used a diagonal coefficient was D =
√
n
and a low noise of random values in µ = 1 and our security analysis will be
based on those parameters. However, we do not see a problem with taking a noise
within µ = 4 in the original GGH proposal in [28] or when as it was the case
when Micciancio applied the use of a HNF [50]. Following the work in [50] and
[28], we can also choose our messages such that ‖m‖2 ≤ 12 min ‖s
∗
i ‖2 where s∗i
is the i-th vector of the orthogonalized basis obtained from the secret key using
the Gram-Schmidt orthogonialization process, or simply encode it as a vector in
[1− µ, µ− 1]n. However, the message space we actually use in this paper will be
different as we resort to a padding technique to attempt to reach IND-CCA secu-
rity. The decryption works as v ∈ L(Pk) ⊂ L(Sk), thus separating m from v as
before. We will discuss security concerns related to this scheme in the next section
(and the appendix), especially why det(R) have to be co-prime to Sk and have a
perfect HNF. In particular, we will show that structural attacks are no longer effec-
tive when R is sufficiently large. L(Pk) no longer admits a diagonally dominant
basisD+R therefore the BDDγ key recovery attack on (d, 0, ..., 0), (0, d, 0, ..., 0),
· · · (0, ..., 0, d) is no longer applicable. Nevertheless, the ratio between the size of
the messages we can decrypt and the size of the public key will decrease. We
will explicitly express the factor later. The question is now whether we solve the
problem with the previous third point “it is hard to recover the secret key from the
public key" in our modified scheme.
3.2 Modified attack on the intersected GGH key
As stated earlier, the structural key recovery attack using BDDγ on (d, 0, ..., 0),
(0, d, 0, ..., 0), · · · (0, ..., 0, d) in L(Pk) does not work since L(d ∗ Id + R) 6=
L(Pk), but L(d ∗ Id+R) = L(Sk) ⊂ L(Pk). Adapting this attack to L(Pk) re-
quires finding L(Sk) in L(Pk), and then using the structural key recovery attack.
We assume the existence of a function ∆ which finds the “optimal" overlattice
L(Sk) given L(Pk) (the overlattice that admits a diagonal basis, experimental
data suggests it is indeed the “weakest" overlattice, see next section).
To the best of our knowledge, the difficulty of recovering L(Sk) in L(Pk) is
mostly dependent on the values of det(Pk) and det(Sk). The efficiency of the
modified attack is dependent of the efficiency of the overlattice recovery function
∆.
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Input: Pk the public key of full rank n, d the diagonal coefficient, φ a
BDDγ solver, ∆ an “optimal" overlattice
Output: Sk the secret key
// Find L = L(Sk) among all integer overlattices of L(Pk)
L ← ∆(L(Pk));
Sk ← d ∗ Idn;
// Loop on every position of the diagonal
foreach {i ∈ [1..n]} do
// Find r the difference between (0, ..., di, ..., 0) and L
r ← φ(L, Sk[i]);
Sk[i]← Sk[i] + r;
end
return Sk
Algorithm 2: Modified Diagonal Dominant Key recovery attack
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In this case, we will consider Pk and R to have a perfect HNF and Sk to be
able to be reduced to a perfect HNF as we believe it offers the best security
assumptions. As a bonus it also allows a fair comparison with random matrices,
as randomly selected matrices from an increasingly big random determinant tend
to have a perfect HNF [29]. Experimental results also suggest that most lattices
are “equivalent" to a lattice admitting a perfect HNF, whose easily computable
“equivalency" relation might cover most of co-cyclic lattices (see Appendix 2)
and allow us to use Gama’s work on their structural worst-case to average-case
reduction [23]. We state the following theorem, which partly solve the problem of
requiring perfect HNFs for intersections.
Theorem 2. Let A and B be perfect HNFs basis of L(A) and L(B) lattices of full
rank n, where det(A), det(B) are co-prime. Let C be the HNF basis of L(A) ∩
L(B). Then det(C) = det(A)det(B), C has perfect HNF, and
∀i ∈ [2, n], Ci,1 =
{
Ai,1 mod det(A)
Bi,1 mod det(B)
Example 2. A,B have perfect HNF and L = L(A) ∩ L(B).
A =

17 0 0 0
12 1 0 0
5 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
, B =

3 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
2 0 0 1
, therefore
HNF (L) =

51 0 0 0
46 2 0 0
23 1 1 0
35 0 0 1

The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix 1. If we intersect two lat-
tices whose HNF basis are not perfect or whose determinant are not coprime, the
result won’t be perfect and common factors might appear (see Appendix 1).
In our case, considering C = Pk, A = Sk and B = R, we have to avoid L(Sk)
to be easily recovered. Theorem 2 is also interesting for an attacker as it reveals
one of the main issue of our approach which we discuss in the next subsection. Let
ω(M) be the number of prime factors counted without multiplicity in the decom-
position of det(M). Then
det(C) =
ω(A)∏
i=1
pi , det(B) =
ω(B)∏
i=0
qi , det(C) = (
ω(A)∏
i=1
pi)(
ω(B)∏
i=1
qi) (3.1)
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which means ω(C) = ω(A)+ω(B) and very easily lead to the following property:
Property 1. Let C be a perfect HNF square matrix of dimension n. The cou-
ples (L(A),L(B)) where A and B are perfect HNFs of the same dimension with
det(A) and det(B) co-prime such thatL(C) = L(A)∩L(B) and det(A)det(B) =
det(C) corresponds exactly to the couples (a > 0, b > 0) where a and b are co-
primes such that ab = det(C): there is exactly 2ω(C) possibilities.
Each possible solution (L(A),L(B)) corresponds exactly to (det(A), det(B)).
Therefore recovering L(A) from L(C), i.e., the complexity of the overlattice
distinguisher ∆, is assumed to be at least polynomially equivalent to distinguish-
ing pi from qi in equations (1). As we work in post-quantum cryptography we
assume that factorization problem can be solved in polynomial time [71]. As we
explain later, we will purposely choose keys with very smooth determinants, which
make factorization easy even on the non-quantum case.
As ω(C) is lower-bounded by ω(A) and have no upper bound limit (as we have
complete control over det(B)), one might first think that the number of combina-
tions to search is 2ω(C). However, if we assume an oracle that knows what type
of lattice to search for, then it is unsafe to assume the attacker has no knowledge
of ω(A). We then assume an attacker have possession of exactly ω(A) and ω(B),
the number of combinations he has to try is then
(ω(C)
ω(A)
)
=
(ω(C)
ω(B)
)
1. In practice,
the attacker will probably only have an approximation which grows the number
of combinations by quite a lot which is a much bigger number depending on how
precise the approximation is, but for simplicity we assume he has the exact value.
Hence, if ω(C) is small or if ω(A) or ω(B) is too small relative to the number of
possibilities, it might be too easy to recover L(A), which would nullify the point
of our modification. In practice, if we let the scheme untouched as it is, then ω(A)
will most often be very low, as illustrated by the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Erdös - Kac Theorem [19]). Let ρ(n) the number of prime factors
of the integer n, then the probability distribution of ρ(n)−log logn√
log logn
is the standard
normal distribution.
Experimental data on low dimensions suggest that ω(Pk) is indeed too low
to ensure a reasonable number of combinations. To deal with that problem, we
1 We note that the notation Cnr is often used instead of
(
n
r
)
. They both mean "n choose r" and
equal n!
r!(n−r)!
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first optimistically assume that without the knowledge of det(Sk), an attacker will
have no choice rather than trying every possible combination stated by the property
(1). Our proposed solution to this apparent weakness is to ensure the number of
combinations is sufficiently large to make sure it is not feasible to recover L(Sk).
Therefore our target public key should have this form:
Pk =

det(Pk) 0 ... 0
Pk[2, 1]
... Idn−1
Pk[n, 1]
, det(Pk) =∏ω(Pk)i=1 pi
∀i 6= j, gcd(pi, pj) = 1
where ω(Sk) + ω(R) = ω(Pk) is large enough to allow a large number of com-
binations. To achieve this, we must generate Sk and R such that HNF (Sk) and
R have the same form as Pk (Theorem 2) while controlling ω(Sk) and ω(R).
3.3 Countermeasure by controlling ω(Sk), ω(R) on key generation
From the last subsection two properties must arise from our keys if we want our
modification to be effective: one is the perfectness of our HNF basis, the other the
smoothness of our keys’ determinants.
First of all, we begin by showing the generation algorithm of the random matrix
R. We first choose the determinant det(R) we want to obtain, and create
R =

det(R) 0 ... 0
R[2, 1]
... Idn−1
R[n, 1]

such that ∀i ∈ [2, n], R[i, 1] are random integer values in [0, det(R)− 1].
With the knowledge of how to generate R, one simple way to maximize ω(Pk)
and thus the number of possibilities is to increase ω(R) until we reach the number
of required combinations without caring about ω(Sk). However, this is not wise:
we mentioned before that the ratio size of the message over size of the public key
is lower in our modified GGH than in the original GGH. As in both schemes we
use the same private key the size of the message m we decrypt remain unchanged.
Let Pkorg be the public key of the original GGH scheme (i.e HNF (Sk)). Noting
that Size(Pk) ≈ Size(HNF (Sk)) + Size(R) = Size(Pkorg) + Size(R) ≈
Size(Pkorg) + n log(det(R)). Let c be the factor determining the ratio decrease.
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Then we have:
c ≈ Size(Pkorg)
Size(Pkorg) + n log(det(R))
=
Size(HNF (Sk))
Size(HNF (Sk)) + n log(det(R))
(3.2)
Therefore compared to the original GGH the size increase of the public key is
solely determined by det(R). Thus, for the benefit of key size, we choose to
have ω(R) < ω(Sk). We will discuss later what this implies at the end of this
subsection.
We know have to generate Sk. It is a bit harder to obtain a perfect HNF of a
diagonal dominant matrix with a chosen determinant det(Sk). Our targeted end
result is
HNF (Sk) =

det(Sk) 0 ... 0
HNF (Sk)[2, 1]
... Idn−1
HNF (Sk)[n, 1]

such that ∀i ∈ [2, n], HNF (Sk)[i, 1] are integer values in [0, det(Sk) − 1] and
det(Sk) =
∏ω(Sk)
i=1 pi and ∀i 6= j, gcd(pi, pj) = 1.
In the following, we will illustrate and then explain the way to achieve this:
Let Dd be a diagonal dominant matrix of dimension n − 1 with diagonal co-
efficient d whose HNF is perfect, and c a column of n − 1 entries within [−µ, µ]
where µ is also the bound of the noise of Dd. We concatenate c on the left of Dd
and compute the HNF of the result to obtain D′d.
D′d = HNF

 c Dd

 =

a b 0 ... 0
...
... Idn−2

If a = D′d[1, 1] and b = D
′
d[1, 2] are not co-prime we retry with a different col-
umn c until those two values are co-primes. Once they are co-prime we compute
u, v such that |ua − bv| = det(Sk), ensuring det(Sk) is co-prime with either a
or b (for simplicity we assume b is co-prime with u, the algorithm in Appendix 3
provide a more general form), such that
2d× det(Dd) > det(Sk) > d× det(Dd), det(Sk) - det(Dd) (3.3)
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We create a line l of n entries with l[1] = v and l[2] = u, reduce l with Babai’s
nearest plane algorithm and concatenate the result l′ to c and Dd as shown below
to obtain Sk as we wanted, which is still a diagonal dominant matrix relatively
close of parameters d and µ and possess a perfect Hermite Normal Form.
l = [v, u, 0, ..., 0], l′ = NearestP lane(l, [c|Dd])
Sk =

l′[1] l′[2] ... l′[n]
c Dd

And the Hermite Normal Form of Sk is perfect, since:
HNF (Sk) = HNF


l′[1] l′[2] ... l′[n]
c Dd


= HNF


v u 0 ... 0
a b 0 ... 0
...
... Idn−2


and because we ensured a and b co-prime, |ua − bv| = det(Sk) and u and b
co-primes:
HNF (Sk) =

det(Sk) 0 ... 0
... Idn−1

Now that we know how to create Sk and R with chosen determinants, we must
decide how to choose det(Sk) and det(R) to obtain secure values of ω(Sk) and
ω(Pk). This is how we suggest to do it and use in most experimentations. We first
generate Dd as we see fit (the same matrix used when generating Sk), and we fix
a prime we call a “scaling factor" that must be prime to det(Dd), then enumerate
all primes from a certain point (at least strictly greater than the “scaling factor")
and choose to pick them randomly until their product is bigger thanDd (and prime
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to det(Dd)). We denote that set of primes Sp. We then take as much factors of
Sp as we see fit to construct det(R), and keep the rest and multiply the remaining
product by a power of the scaling factor to respect the bound given by equation
(3). Suppose that the scaling factor is given away for free, the number of combina-
tions an attacker has to search is indeed
( |Sp|
ω(R)
)
. Note that given Sp the maximum
number of combinations achievable is if ω(R) = |Sp|2 .
Overall, the generation of keys is done in polynomial time: the computations of
the HNF and Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm are the most time consuming opera-
tions and they both run in polynomial time. To study the complexity and how this
can be generated in practice, we refer the readers to Appendix 3.
We present in this table the minimum ratio ω(R)/ω(Pk) required to go over
some 2λ combinations in total using the algorithm we just described, and to ensure
ωR < ωSk we use a scaling factor of 2, enumerating and choosing all primes from
3 until the product Sp is bigger than det(Dd)d, assuming a diagonal coefficient of
d =
√
n where n is the dimension and getting an average determinant of nn/2 for
Sk. When Sp is not sufficiently large, then we put the symbol -.
λ 300 400 500 600 700 800
80 34/87 24/115 21/142 19/168 18/195 17/222
100 - 37/115 29/142 26/168 24/195 23/222
120 - - 42/142 35/168 32/195 29/222
140 - - - 48/168 41/195 37/222
160 - - - 69/168 53/195 47/222
However if we start enumerating from 2741 which is the 400th prime and then his
successive primes:
λ 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
80 - - - 28/96 23/119 21/141 19/164
100 - - - - 35/119 30/141 27/164
120 - - - - - 42/141 36/164
140 - - - - - - 49/164
160 - - - - - - -
We put a blank entry at λ = 160 for dimension n = 800, but we are actually
very close with log2(
(164
82
)
) > 159.99. If we want to enforce ω(R) < ω(Sk) while
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using the same algorithm, we only need to increase d to a bigger value, increasing
det(Sk) and thus ω(Pk). The next table shows the minimum amount of primes to
put in Sp, which means the minimum value of ω(Pk) (+1 if we count the scaling
factor) to achieve a number of combinations strictly superior to 2λ:
λ 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
ω(Pk) 84 104 124 144 165 185 205 225 245
As a “rule of thumb", to achieve a number of combinations of 2λ we require
|Sp| = ω(Pk) + 1 > λ + 4 for λ ∈ [1, 250]. We can deduce that in practice
the number of combinations will always be as high as we need it to be, either
by increasing d the diagonal coefficient of our secret key Sk or by adding fac-
tors to R. Therefore security concerns do not lie in the number of combinations
(L(Sk),L(R)) any longer.
3.4 Key sizes comparisons and perfect HNFs
First of all, we would like to stress that this comparison only aims to show that
our obfuscation technique applied to GGH is not impractical as far as storage is
concerned. LWE−based cryptosystems usually rely on stronger security assump-
tions than our proposal and other cryptosystems like NTRU have been studied for
a much longer time: the lack of literature on lattice intersections do not let us claim
the same level of confidence in security assumptions. Here we compare in table
1 our public key sizes to to the public key sizes (in bits) presented in Lindner and
Peikert’s work for LWE-based encryption [42] and the key sizes we obtain with
intersections (in average). We only compare with the size of their keys per user,
and not their full key which is already much bigger. Note that unlike q−ary lat-
tices the value of the determinant is not set at the key generation, but usually do not
stray away from each other by too much bits. To compute the key size of a perfect
HNF, one just have to compute look at the number of bits of the determinant, and
multiply it by the lattice dimension. For dimension n, we use
√
n as the diagonal
coefficient and [−1, 1] as noise interval.
As we see, their partial public key is only smaller than our full public keys
for higher dimensions. Furthermore, the techique used in their scheme is a very
clever way to delegate part of the key to a trusted source or to the user that is an
instance from an abstract system presented by Micciancio [51], while our scheme
has mostly kept the basic setup from the GGH cryptosystem [28]. It might be pos-
sible that in the future that such techniques become available for classical random
lattices (and most of them admitting a perfect HNF), leading to better key sizes
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Dimension q Public Key size per User
128 2053 1.8× 105
192 4093 2.9× 105
256 4093 4.0× 105
320 4093 4.9× 105
HH
HHHHs
n
125 150 175 200 225 250
20 6.1× 104 8.8× 104 1.2× 105 1.6× 105 2.1× 105 2.6× 105
40 6.5× 104 9.4× 104 1.3× 105 1.7× 105 2.2× 105 2.7× 105
60 7.7× 104 1.0× 105 1.4× 105 1.8× 105 2.3× 105 2.8× 105
80 - - 1.6× 105 2.0× 105 2.4× 105 2.9× 105
100 - - - 2.2× 105 2.6× 105 3.1× 105
HHH
HHHs
n
275 300 325 350 375 400
20 3.2× 105 3.9× 105 4.6× 105 5.3× 105 6.2× 105 7.1× 105
40 3.3× 105 4.0× 105 4.7× 105 5.5× 105 6.3× 105 7.3× 105
60 3.4× 105 4.1× 105 4.9× 105 5.6× 105 6.5× 105 7.5× 105
80 3.6× 105 4.3× 105 5.0× 105 5.8× 105 6.7× 105 7.6× 105
100 3.8× 105 4.4× 105 5.2× 105 6.0× 105 6.9× 105 7.8× 105
Table 1. LWE key sizes from Lindner and Peikert on top, key sizes from perfect
HNFs and intersections at the bottom (n = dimension, s = log2
(
ω(Pk)
ω(Sk)
)
)
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per user for higher dimensions.
Perfect Hermite Normal Forms also allows us to improve the encryption scheme.
Instead of sending a vector c = m + v where v ∈ L is random, we can choose v
such as v = (c1, 0, ..., 0) i.e., only a single integer of size det(L) in average will
be sent. This is done by reducing the message m by a Gaussian Elimination with
the rows of the public key, where they all have 1 in their diagonal. Furthermore,
the security is not affected. Since the transformation will give the same result
as m for any m′ = m + v′ with any v′ ∈ L, breaking this transformation will
break all schemes which use BDDγ as a security assumption. The decryption is
left unchanged, since the only difference is that c = m + v′ where v′ ∈ L is not
random anymore. This is actually convenient from a practical point of view, where
encryption can be reduced to n additions and n − 1 multiplications (by relatively
low integers on one side and big ones on the other side) modulo the determinant:
this is comparable to a modular knapsack. Lindner and Peikert also presented in
their paper their different ciphertext size for messages of 128 bits. The smallest
ciphertext size they presented was for n = 128 and q = 2053, and it has the same
size of our average determinant size (hence, in our case, cipertext size) for a lattice
of dimension n = 475 and combinations security s = 100.
Generating public keys, however, is slow, as it involves computing Hermite
Normal Forms. On the other hand, Gaussian sampling, which is required for a lot
of LWE-based cryptosystems, was also far from fast and memory efficient and led
to alternatives like LWR [10] or uniform distribution [45]. Weiden and al reported
that Gaussian sampling takes 50% on the running time of their implementation of
Lyubashevsky signature scheme [46] and Dwarakanath and al [18] reported that
Peikert’ sampler can take up to 12MB for some parameters [62]. Nevertheless,
the research is still very active on that matter and has seen various improvements
[13, 17, 18] mostly targeted at lattice-based cryptography thanks to the popularity
of that matter in the community but not to a point where sampling is both very fast
and memory efficient. On the other hand, research to compute Hermite Normal
Forms nowadays are mostly done for random matrices [61, 64] and not targeted
at structured matrices, especially ones that arise in cryptography. A rebound of
interest towards Hermite Normal Forms in the community might lead to similar
improvements in the future.
4 Security
The security assumptions relies on two important points:
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• Assumption 1: Recovering the "optimal" integer overlattice is hard. (∆ is
polynomial on the number of combinations).
• Assumption 2: The underlying BDDγ problem is hard (on our specific keys).
• Assumption 3: The underlying modular knapsack problem is hard (on our
specific keys and messages).
Like every cryptosystem, even when based on a hard problem, what we use is
specific instances of a hard problem, which might not be as hard as the original
problem. Therefore we discuss in the following the special structure which arise
from our scheme. Note that because the main idea is to change the public key
without changing the secret key while keeping the encryption/decryption process
unchanged, the message space is left unchanged along with the BDDγ problem
from the previous iteration from Micciancio [50], except the lattice has a slightly
bigger determinant.
Furthermore, our first assumption is actually very pessimistic. Micciancio’s
scheme has not been broken asymptotically, and up to this day basis reductions
techniques are still not well understood enough to predict given a HNF how easy
it would be to reduce the corresponding lattice. It is therefore possible that in the
future further theorical studies will allow us to strongly reinforce our first assump-
tion. Our particular structure (perfect HNF) also allows to convert our instance
of the BDDγ problem to an instance of a single general modular knapsack prob-
lem with very smooth moduli, therefore our third assumption is that our instances
of modular knapsack with smooth determinant are hard, which can be seen as a
multiple modular knapsack with coprime modulis.
4.1 Smoothness of determinant
To discuss the problem of the smoothness of the determinant, we assume the ex-
istence of a polynomial time solving oracle which can determine if a combination
of primes lattice is the correct and output a weak basis out of it if yes. We also
assume that the attacker does not have an algorithm that permits to eliminate prime
overlattices one by one until only factors of Sk remains, or something easy to de-
cipher with which would lead to an easier solution that searching through every
possibility, which we think is reasonable as our experimentations could not distin-
guish any overlattice from random lattices. If there was such an algorithm, then
this might apply to any random lattice and lowers the overall security of lattice
problems. However, it is possible that the problem is much easier depending of
the kind of secret keys we actually use and what we intersect it with.
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The only attacks based on overlattices according to the best of our knowledge
were one from Becker, Gama and Joux [4] and one from Gama, Izabachene,
Nguyen and Xie [23] even then the way their overlattices are generated is very
different and does not search for integer overlattices specifically. Aside from the
overlattices consideration, there is also no attack in the best of our knowledge that
makes use of a smooth determinant on random lattices, and other popular schemes
such as NTRU [32] and Ring-LWE [49] also rely on lattices with smooth determi-
nants (q−ary lattices have naturally smooth determinants, but their factorization
differ).
Under all of those assumptions, the total security provided by our enhancement
is either solving the problem directly on the public key, either finding the right
combination multiplied by the time of running a detection oracle (find which inte-
ger overlattice is weak), or working in a properly chosen non-integer overlattice of
a large enough volume. The latter possibility, which could seem the most efficient,
is in our opinion not-effective: to the best of our knowledge our system do not hold
a particular weakness towards this approach compared to any other random lattice
as our public key seem to hold the same structure as far as our heuristic experi-
mentations on HKZ-reduced basis are concerned (see next subsection). Assuming
the "weak integer overlattice" detection oracle runs in polynomial time (for sim-
plification we will consider it constant, but in practice we do not even know how
to even create a practical one, the latter security is bounded by
( ω(Pk)
dω(Pk)/2e
)
, which
as we discussed on the previous section is not a problem in high dimensions as
ω(Pk) grow big, as in our tests we never reach that bound (Figure 2).
We stress that finding the shortest vector for a small prime overlattice does not
help solving the problem in the ring product in general. It is in fact still a research
problem to be able to compare two numbers given their decompositions over a
ring product without computing them back, as it is the main issue with Residue
Number Systems (RNS for cryptography is an old and still active research topic
[7–9, 25]). This is even more problematic when comparing vectors.
4.2 Perfectness of basis and primality between factors
Due to Goldstein and Mayer’s work [29], taking a perfect hermite normal form
matrix with a random prime determinant can be considered as taking random lat-
tice. As we are intersecting a lot of lattices of this type, with different prime
determinants which result in a perfect HNF, we are comparing our results with
other perfect HNF bases with the same determinant and random entries. Since
our experimental results show that 80% of basis generated with coefficients from
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bounded entries admits a perfect HNF or are equivalent to one by permutation of
columns (see Appendix 2), we believe the comparison to be fair.
This is further reinforced due to recent works from Nguyen and al [57], used
shortly after by Gama and al [23] to make their generalized worst-case to average-
case reduction which allows us to use a much more general lattice form and there-
fore very different from those q-ary lattices first introduced by Ajtai [1]. And in
practice, Chen and Nguyen’s work [15] on Darmstadt’s lattice challenges lead us
to think it is easier to solve problems (find short vectors) in a q−ary lattice than
in a random lattice of large volume, therefore in term of basis recovery attacks the
perfect Hermite Normal Form could be actually more desirable.
On top of that there is no currently known algorithm to our knowledge that will
provide efficient secret keys with a imperfect HNF on purpose (one that cannot
be converted to a perfect HNF, see Appendix 2), where the imperfect coefficients
do not leak information on the first element of the diagonal (they very often have
common divisors for example). We also keep in mind that if L(M) is a lattice that
admits a diagonal dominant basis, then so do L(σ(M)) where σ is a column per-
mutation, retaining the exact same values measuring basis quality in every criteria
known (see Appendix 2).
Furthermore, given a finite set of prime factors on the diagonal, the perfect form
gives the hardest challenge, as it is harder to guess a large number of factors in a
single position rather than a small fixed amount in multiple positions (given the
same total amount of primes), provided we could make sure it wouldn’t be able to
transform into a perfect HNF by permutation (if having a perfect HNF becomes a
weakness).
Having factors prime to each other not only ensures an easier perfect HNF, but
also avoid giving information beneficial to the attacker (see Appendix 1). As stated
before, having a perfect HNF is also desirable for when managing keys.
4.3 Shortest Vector and Basis Structure
We present the result of experimentations for intersecting diagonal dominant type
matrices with a random one with a perfect HNF form below. We chose 3 as our
scaling factor, allowing our perturbation matrix to have a measurable determinant
as a power of 2. To determine the impact of R over Pk’s resistance against enu-
meration and classical lattice reduction techniques compared to random lattices
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[70], we also observe the distribution of coefficients using SVP on small dimen-
sion (40), comparing them to the random case (every time with the exact same
determinant and dimension). It seems like after reaching a size of 32 bits there
is almost no difference between Pk or random lattices of the same determinant
(Figure 1). As the difference tends to decrease very rapidly we scale the graphs to
the extremas.
However, the obfuscation of L(Sk)’s structure is not exclusive to L(Sk)’ short-
est vectors. We show with the following tests that the obfuscation work on whole
HKZ-reduced basis of L(Pk). In that regard, we compare condition numbers
(CN) with the max norm. The test is done in dimension 30, 40 and 50 with over
20 matrices per dimension and 20 witnesses per new determinant, the diagonal
dominant type being having noise in [−1, 1] with the diagonal being d
√
dime. We
only choose matrices with a perfect form. Every matrix computed has been HKZ
reduced.
First, with dimension 30. det(Sk) has on average 79 bits.
det(R) 1 24 28 212 216
Avg CN (inter) 55.33 158.48 199.38 234.25 260.06
Avg CN (rdm) 269.41 273.39 272.88 273.99 273.74
det(R) 220 224 228 232
Avg CN (inter) 263.49 262.40 268.40 263.10
Avg CN (rdm) 267.13 267.31 271.71 272.65
With the dimension 40, det(Sk) has on average 113 bits.
det(R) 1 24 28 212 216
Avg CN (inter) 69.52 304.18 400.67 529.02 620.70
Avg CN (rdm) 755.89 760.90 805.09 755.15 789.46
det(R) 220 224 228 232
Avg CN (inter) 691.42 709.63 748.11 769.18
Avg CN (rdm) 786.06 770.28 760.09 786.72
With dimension 50, det(Sk) has on average 151 bits.
24 A. Sipasseuth, T. Plantard and W. Susilo
Figure 1. Distribution of the shortest vector’s coefficients. From left to right and top
to bot: det(R) = 1, 28, 216, 232
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det(R) 1 24 28 212 216 220
Avg CN (inter) 78.98 524.19 636.06 837.49 1087.47 1426.19
Avg CN (rdm) 2038.68 1976.51 1993.44 1952.17 1944.57 2021.48
det(R) 224 228 232 236 240 244
Avg CN (inter) 1616.31 1682.42 1795.90 1830.14 1870.03 1871.08
Avg CN (rdm) 2074.12 1991.93 1964.16 1979.45 2000.98 1998.67
According to our experimental results there is little influence on increasing the
size of the perturbation over 32 bits, as we get very close to the same condition
number as a random HKZ reduced matrix with the same determinant. This reflects
the results we have when measuring the distribution of shortest vectors’ coeffi-
cients values. This means that obtaining a good basis of of the public key will
allow to decrypt nearly as well as with a good basis of a random matrix, being
very sensitive to noise. Therefore the only factor to consider is the number of
primes, and as we grow larger in dimension, we will obviously take much bigger
primes, ending up in a noise with a determinant size of over 32 bits. We can then
take small primes to minimize the lattice gap (as we will measure below).
What we need to consider is the possibility to distinguish the different overlat-
tices very easily (which would nullify our improvement of GGH), or possible to
know if by intersecting different overlattices we could determine if we are getting
closer to the right combination or not. Therefore, we compare condition numbers
of Sk and R’s overlattices, the intersection of Sk’s overlattices and R’s overlat-
tices separately or mixed together (with all matrices being HKZ reduced) to HKZ
reduced basis of random lattices of the same respective determinant for every test.
The result is that the overlattices themselves seem to be indistinguishable from
random cases. Since removing several factors of Sk randomly does seem to make
the problem harder (in the sense that the resulting lattice looks more random than
keeping all factors), this observation should also hold for non-integer overlattices.
For now, it does not seem that an attack on a random overlattice would be more
effective.
4.4 Message Recovery Attacks
We now measure the influence of R on Pk against message recovery attacks, and
we will use the lattice gap in that regard. We assume the attack used is the popular
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heuristic transformation from CV P to SV P by attacking an extended basis B.
What we need then is closely enough approximate values of λ1(B) and λ2(B).
In that regard, we consider λ1(B) the size of our message m. With maximum
decryption capacity, we have:
||m S−1k ||∞ ≤ ||m||∞||S
−1
k ||∞ ≤
1
2
As we take the best value possible:
||m||∞ = 12||S−1k ||∞
λ1(B) = ||m||2 ≈
√
n
2||S−1k ||∞
and we assume λ2(B) ≈
√
n
2πeDet(Pk)
1/n with the Gaussian Heuristic. It is the
best approximation we can use, as we do not know the length of the shortest vector
in the public key2. Therefore the lattice gap is
δ(Pk, Sk) = (Det(Pk)
1/n×2||Sk−1||∞√
2πe
)
It is a bit different than most schemes, as our public key does not represent the
same lattice than our private key. The first remark we do when looking at the
formula is that the gap increase as det(R) increase, which might give us a good
reason to carefully manage Size(det(R)) besides key size considerations.
Here, we present our experimental results for the simulations on computing the
root lattice gap (with primes starting from 3, scaling factor 2). From the earlier
work from Gama and Nguyen [24], the problem is solvable as soon as the lattice
gap is lower than a fraction of the Hermite factor. We observe the evolution of the
lattice gap for different number of combinations over increasing dimensions, and
it appears that increasing the number of combinations have a lower impact as we
increase dimensions, thus a high value for det(R) is not a problem as dimensions
increase.
As the constants mentioned in Gama and Nguyen’s work [24] depends of the algo-
rithm used and the lattice structure, we scale the curve with factors 0.50 and 0.20.
We can observe that, in the pessimistic assumption of a constant of 0.20 (which is
not the worst since [24] mentions a factor of 0.18 for BKZ-20), we do not reach
the optimal factor of 1.005 (considered by many to be impossible to reach without
proper structure in dimension 500 [24]) even past dimension n = 850.
2 We note that other competitive approximations for random lattices [38,74] do exist but as those
results are relatively recent they seem to be widely ignored by the cryptography community,
thus we use more "popular" analysis tools for now.
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Figure 2. Evolution of the Root Lattice Gap from dimension 225 to 850, C = 1/2
on the left and C = 1/5 on the right
4.5 IND-CCA security and message space
Suppose the private key has been generated by a diagonal coefficient D and a
noise bound µ for a full-rank lattice of dimension, a first suggestion would be to
use messages in the space [−M,M ]n where M = D−µ2 . This allows us to decrypt
a number of bits which would be a multiple of the lattice dimension. However the
scheme does not achieve IND-CCA security that way, and it is advised to sacrifice
the number of bits and restrict the message space to achieve IND-CCA security.
To achieve IND-CCA security, one can set the ciphertext to encrypt only a sin-
gle bit, with a technique similar to the one proposed in Regev’s first LWE-based
public-key encryption scheme [68] where the decryption is a test whether an inte-
ger is closer to 0 or to a certain bound, which, from a lattice-based point of view,
just consists to set bounds for a norm on deciphered vectorsm (original messages):
for all deciphered plaintexts m and ‖m‖ ∈]a, b[, where a > 0 and b is within our
decryption capacity, set if ‖m‖ > a+b2 then return the bit 1 as the message, or 0
otherwise.
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Using padding techniques
Alternatively, we can also use techniques which are already used for number theo-
retical schemes: suppose our message is composed of bits, we can apply padding
techniques such as OAEP [11] to make the scheme more secure (and its further
improvements such as [72]), or more general ones such as REACT [59] or the
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [22]. Those techniques work assuming the one-
wayness of our initial problem, as it is done with NTRU. This seems to be the
most straightforward method to achieve IND-CCA security in the random oracle
model, and we will briefly present the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation as it was
recently suggested by Peikert for his suggestion of lattice-based cryptography for
the internet [63].
The Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation presented in [22] is to transform the en-
cryption of the message m to
Ehypk [m, c] = E
asy
pk [c,H(c, E
sy
G(c)[m])] || E
sy
G(c)[m]
where
• Easypk [m, c] is the asymmetric encryption of the indicated message m using
the indicated coins c as random bits and the public key pk,
• Esysk [m] is the symmetric encryption of the indicated message m using the
private key sk,
• σ is a random string chosen from an appropriate domain and
• G,H are hash functions, where G(σ), H(σ) are the hashes of σ by G,H
respectively.
We need to choose a symmetric encryption scheme to apply this transformation
and depending of the symmetric scheme chosen, one might be interested to look at
the earlier, simpler and more specialized proposition first given in [21]. The same
can be said for the choices of the hash functions, and such considerations are also
important if using OAEP or REACT (which on the other hand do not require an
additional symmetric scheme and seem computationally less complex).
NTRU, on the other hand, use padding schemes such as NAEP [34, 35] that are
specific to NTRU due to its usage of polynomials and cannot be applied to other
lattice schemes. We stress that a precise choice of a padding scheme is not trivial,
as earlier choices for NTRU have been proven insecure, due to the particular na-
ture of NTRU rather than the padding itself [33, 56].
Enhancing GGH’s scheme with intersecting lattices 29
REACT is also a good candidate for padding, due its efficiency. The encryption
of the message m is transformed to
Epk(m;R, r) = Easypk (R; r) || G(R)⊕m || H(m,R, E
asy
pk (R; r), G(R)⊕m)
where
• Easypk (m, c) is the asymmetric encryption of the message m using the coins c
as random bits and the public key pk,
• R is a random element from the message space,
• r a random element from the random coin space
• G,H are hash functions.
Here both encryption and decryption only require two more hashings compared
to the original scheme, and do not require an additional symmetric encryption
scheme unlike the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.
Since we have to use a padding scheme for real life applications, and padding
schemes are mostly made for binary written messages (XOR operations are al-
most always involved), we define our message space as [−b, b]n−k, where b =
blog2(
D−µ
2 )c − 1 (that way each cell can be XORed with any binary string and
remain in the decryption space), D being the diagonal coefficient and µ the noise
bound of the secret key, n the lattice dimension and 0 ≤ k ≤ n the number of
dimensions we sacrifice in the message space to add the padding and extra sur-
jections (to make the original scheme pre-padding surjective and not bijective,
especially to assign a space for random coins). Values for D,µ are suggested in
the next section.
5 Discussions
5.1 Parameter choices
To achieve a reasonably improved security (from lattice reduction techniques)
without drastically increasing the key size, we suggest to use a matrix of dimen-
sion at least 400, with a diagonal coefficient of 20 and a noise bound of 1. Suppose
we sacrifice half of the dimension for padding, this yields a number of bits of 4
per remaining dimension, which will be 800 bits. We suggest using any random
family of primes which total products slightly exceeds the size of the determinant
of the secret key, and furthermore whenever possible we should avoid very small
primes to avoid any information potentially recovered by the scaling factor (even
if unrealistic). The increase in key size will depends on the size of the random
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matrix we use to hide the secret lattice (as shown on Section 2). Moreover, taking
too big primes will reduce the number of combinations, hence lowering the secu-
rity in terms of discovering the secret lattice. We then recommend using primes
between 541 (the 100-th prime) and 2741 (the 400−th prime), those are arbitrary
choices but offers enough combinations for whatever matrix of such dimension or
even much higher would need from what we see on the previous tables, and the
size of the noise generated is in our opinion enough to protect against basis recov-
ery attacks. The scaling factor can be as small as 2. Depending on the security
level required (for various applications, as mentioned by NIST [54]), we can let
λ > 64, 80, 96, 128 as far as the number of combinations 2λ is concerned. We note
as intersecting a small random lattice is already improving the security, therefore
even if we do not reach the same average as random matrices, the public key is
still more secure.
Intersecting lattices is a technique that can be used with any kind of lattice. This
technique may raise to other useful applications, which remain unknown.
5.2 Alternate secret keys
Our approach is not only limited to a diagonal dominant matrix. As any message
generated using Pk is equal to a message generated using HNF (Sk), any de-
cryption process using HNF (Sk) as a secret key remains unchanged. The main
problem in our opinion is always how to hide the overlattice L(Sk). As an exam-
ple using tensor products as secret keys [20] would leave a slightly different issue
in hiding det(Sk). Other improvements on GGH type cryptosystems could be
compatible with ours as we leave the decryption and message space unchanged,
therefore security improvements may become cumulative (a case by case study
and adaptation might be necessary). An example of such a possible cumulative
improvement to study can be found in [69].
Additionally, our approach is not limited to a perfect HNF either. A lot of prop-
erties do indeed arise when intersecting lattices which determinants are not co-
prime which could lead to security issues when not kept in mind, as information
on the factorization of det(Sk) is leaked (see Appendix 1). However if we care-
fully generate non-perfect HNF matrices on purpose from intersections it might be
possible to ensure a reasonable security without increasing the key size too much.
Another idea is to use weaker secret keys. In our experiments, we randomized
the occurrence of the noise values in [−1, 1]. However, seeing how intersections
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allow us to hide the secret basis’ structure, we can make it so in a line vector of
the secret key (or even in both lines and columns) the number of times a non-zero
value is used is limited. For example, what if we set 1 to appear α times, and -1 to
appear β times, which will leave χ zeroes, where χ = n−1−(α+β)? If we allow
a big χ, this will lead to a bigger decryption capacity. We do not know if such a
prefixed setting would create visible weaknesses in the result of the intersection,
or the overlattices, and how much impact it will have on the root lattice gap.
Another type of weaker secret key is using ideal lattices. Ideal lattices are a
powerful tool to compress keys and to enable fully homomorphic encryption [26].
The research development in ideal lattices has been very popular in the last years
hence we are providing some remarks on the intersection of ideal lattices. The
advantage of ideal lattice is allowing a stable multiplication, and offering very
compressed keys. Some interesting properties arise when intersecting ideal lattices
(see Appendix 1 and 2), but to the best of our knowledge there is no method to
control the determinant of an ideal lattice, which is how we make intersections
secure in our paper. The possibility of reinforcing the security of ideal lattice
based schemes with intersections also remains an open question.
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A Appendix
A.1 Arithmetic of HNF basis from intersections
In this section, we present all the proofs and technical details concerning intersec-
tions of HNF. We do not focus on the perfect case, as it is just seen as a particular
case, but it allows to understand how an intersection of lattices can break the per-
fectness of a HNF and what phenomenons appear when randomly intersecting
lattices successively.
We will start with a few definitions. We consider line vectors with Mi being the
i−th line vector and Mi,j being the coefficient in the i−th line and j−th column
in the matrix M , and note L(M) lattice generated by M . If v is a vector, we note
vi it’s i−th coefficient.
Definition 14. We denote Sm(M, (i, j)) the square submatrix of M of size (j −
i+1)2 extracted from the h−th lines and columns i ≤ h ≤ j, with 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
We denote Sm(M, (1, i)) = Sm(M, i) the square submatrix with only the first i
lines and columns.
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Definition 15. Let L(A) be a full rank lattice with A in HNF. We denote Li(A)
the sublattice of L(A) such that Li(A) is trivially isomorphic to L(Sm(A, i)), i.e
Li(A) is generated by the first i vectors of A.
Definition 16. A vector v is a "standard" vector if it is also a vector of the Id
matrix basis (i.e 1 in one position 0 in all the others) and "p-standard" if it is a
vector of p × Id matrix, and we say it’s the i−th p−standard when the non-zero
entry is at the i−th position.
Definition 17. For a triangular matrix M of dimension n and i ≤ n, we note
dg(M, i) =
∏i
1 Mi,i = det(Sm(M, i)) and Diag(M, i) = {Mj,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ i}
Definition 18. Let M be the basis of an integer lattice L of dimension n in HNF
form. Then we define Φ(L) the number of non-1 values in the diagonal of M (is
also the number of non-standard columns). As the HNF form is unique, we can
write Φ(B) = Φ(L) for any B basis of L. We say M is of pseudo-perfect form
when Φ(M) = 1 and perfect if Sm(M,n− 1) = Idn−1.
Definition 19. We say a lattice is prime if its an integer lattice whose determinant
is the power of a prime number and is pseudo-perfect.
Property 2. Suppose L(C) = L(A) ∩ L(B), all lattices of dimension n > i, and
A,B,C in HNF, then every vector Ci is uniquely determined by Sm(A, i) and
Sm(B, i) and C1,1 = lcm(A1,1, B1,1). In particular
L(Sm(C, i)) = L(Sm(A, i)) ∩ L(Sm(B, i))
Therefore, modifying Sm(A, (i+ 1, n)) and Sm(B, (i+ 1, n)) have no influence
over Sm(C, i).
Proof. If M is in HNF, the HNF basis of Li(M) is the first i−lines of M . Apply
this directly to L(C) = L(A) ∩ L(B) to obtain the above property.
Property 3. Let A be the HNF basis of a full rank lattice of dimension n ≥ i ≥ 1,
and note g = dg(A, i). The i−th g−standard vector always belongs to L(A).
Proof. We know that for any vector v ∈ Li(A) we have Ai,i|vi.
Let us put α ← gAi,i , and v
′ ← αAi. Note that α is divisible by every coefficient
in Diag(A, i− 1). v′ has g as its head coefficient, and all of its other coefficients
are multiples of α.
Let us eliminate v′i+1 by subtraction: first set α←
α
Ai+1,i+1
, then v′ ← v′−αAi+1.
We note that all coefficients of v′ are still multiple of α. Rinse and repeat for
coefficients (v′i+2, ..., v
′
n) until the end result is v
′ = v, i.e v ∈ L(A).
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Property 4. Suppose A,B,C are in HNF. If L(C) = L(A) ∩ L(B) then
lcm(Ai,i, Bi,i) | Ci,i | lcm(dg(A, i), dg(B, i))
Proof. Using property 2 it is sufficient to work on Li(C), and we know that
Ci = αAi + a
′ = βBi + b
′ with a′ ∈ Li−1(A) and b′ ∈ Li−1(B) and for some
α, β ∈ Z. Therefore Ci,i = αAi,i = βBi,i hence the left part of the expression.
For the right part, just apply the previous property’s reasoning to the i−th g−standard
vector with g = lcm(dg(A, i), dg(B, i)), and find it belongs to L(A)∩L(B).
We note that those bounds are reached in practice and are therefore tight. What
we will be showing next is how the head coefficients are actually affected by the
big non-standard column of the HNF.
Property 5. Suppose A and B are perfect form HNFs basis of L(A) and L(B)
lattices of full rank n, with a = det(A) = A1,1 and b = det(B) = B1,1. Then
L(C) = L(A) ∩ L(B) admits a perfect HNF basis C if and only if
∀i, ∃k1 < b, k2 < a, A1,i + k1a ≡ B1,i + k2b mod lcm(a, b) = C1,1
If the condition is respected then
C1,i = A1,i + k1a = B1,i + k2b mod C1,1
Proof. If the condition is respected for a certain i, then there exists a common
vector in both L(A) and L(B) that have 1 in its i−th position and A1,i + k1a =
A1,i + k2b in its first position, and 0 everywhere else. Therefore it must be rep-
resentable by the basis C, and since Ci,i|vi,i for all i perfect form or not since
enforces Ci,i = 1.
Now suppose the condition is not respected for a certain i, such that Sm(C, i− 1)
already has perfect form. Since Sm(C, i− 1) has perfect form, then every coeffi-
cient that is neither the first nor i−th is reduced to 0 by definition of the HNF. If
Ci,i was equal to 1, then A being perfect would mean C1,i ≡ A1,i (mod a) since
Ci,i ∈ L(A) and same reasoning in B. That would respect the condition, which is
contradictory, hence Ci,i 6= 1.
Property 6. LetA,B two perfect HNF basis of lattices such that det(A) = det(B) =
p a prime number, then either det(C) = det(A ∩ B) = p2 and Φ(C) = 2 with 2
p−standard vectors, or A = B.
Proof. If A = B then it’s obvious. Otherwise, property 5 tells us it’s not possible
to have a perfect HNF. Using the same reasoning, the first i such that A1,i 6= B1,i
will have Ci as a the i−th p−standard vector, as property 4 leaves us only p as a
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diagonal coefficient. Since Sm(C, i−1) is a perfect HNF, the only solution for Ci
to be a vector of L(A) ∩ L(B) is to have Ci = pAi −A1,iA1 = pBi −B1,iB1 i.e
the i−th p−standard vector, since p is prime there is no lower integer that would
make this work.
Now that we have to prove that Sm(C, (i, n)) is a perfect form matrix. For that,
we just have to prove in Zp
∀j ∈]i, n], ∃x, y ∈ Zp, xAi +Aj = yBi +Bj
which is always true in our case as it corresponds to find a solution (x, y) to the
two equations yBi,1 +Bj,1 = xAi,1 +Aj,1 and yBi,i +Bj,i = xAi,i +Aj,i.
Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of property 5 (and to a lesser extent prop-
erty 6). Applying the same reasoning on more than two columns, if we carefully
choose i < n lattices with all same prime determinant p, then it is possible to make
the intersection of those i lattices contain i p−standard vectors in their HNF basis.
For i = n, the HNF of their intersection can be the orthogonal matrix p × Idn.
Generally, the more lattices of determinant d (prime or not) we get, the closer we
get to d× Idn.
It is actually possible to list all possibilities leading to the result of a prime
collision, as we show in this example where p "moves" to the second column (i.e
a2,1 6= b2,1):
L(
 p 0 0a2,1 1 0
a3,1 0 1
) ∩ L(
 p 0 0b2,1 1 0
b3,1 0 1
) = L(
 p 0 00 p 0
c3,1 c3,2 1
)
which leads to c3,1 ≡ c3,2b2,1 + b3,1 ≡ c3,2a2,1 + a3,1 mod p
And supposing we have higher dimension n > 3, then for all i ∈ [3, n]:
ci,1 ≡ ci,2b2,1 + bi,1 ≡ ci,2a2,1 + ai,1 mod p
Hence, a prime collision has lots of easily computable of solutions and anybody
having to solve this can choose the solution he sees fit (just choose a2,1 and b2,1,
p(p− 1) possibilities). For the general case ("collision" at column j), just change
2 by j and 3 by j + 1. The generalization can go even further with determinants
det(A) = px and det(B) = py with x = y. When x 6= y, the result is still pre-
dictable but requires a little more work.
Property 7. • If a lattice is prime, every possible decomposition into an inter-
section of prime lattices must include itself.
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• If a lattice has prime determinant, it has no integer overlattice (except itself).
• For any integer lattice with diagonal coefficients prime with each other (in its
HNF form), there is an unique decomposition into an intersection of prime
lattices with determinants that are prime with each other. (every condition is
important as it becomes false otherwise)
The three properties, directly deduced from the previous ones, are important to
understand the recovery of overlattices. To obtain a prime lattice decomposition,
you just have to use the Chinese Remainder Theorem on every prime factor.
Property 8. Suppose L(C) = L(A) ∩ L(B), and A,B,C are integer matrices.
Then we can recover A,B from C with only the knowledge of Diag(A,n) or
Diag(B,n) in polynomial time on det(C) and n.
Proof. The decomposition into prime lattices allow us to choose which prime lat-
tice are part of A or B. Obtaining the decomposition into prime lattices is done
in polynomial time with the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and then knowledge of
the diagonal coefficients allow us to recover exactly A and B.
Note that if gcd(Diag(A,n), Diag(B,n)) = 1 then the solution is unique.
This recovery assumes the knowledge about the positions of diagonal coeffi-
cients. We do not need to consider the case when both determinants are co-prime,
however it can become tricky when determinants are not co-prime and positions
are unknown. In that case, we will have to use the results from property 6. Suppos-
edly 80% of random lattices with randomly chosen bounded entries have perfect
HNF or are equivalent to one by permutation, and we do want to be as close as
possible of the random case (See Appendix 2): the bigger the primes are, the more
likely a random matrix of the same determinant is going to have an perfect form
[29].
Furthermore, having an imperfect HNF means we have certain coefficients
on the diagonal which potentially reveals some information about the secret key
(whether by their value or by their position) and thus having transforming into a
perfect HNF allows us to hide that information. Therefore, even if we do not ob-
tain an equivalent perfect HNF for a basis M , minimizing Φ(M) is still useful.
Property 4 and 5 ensure that if a lattice has perfect HNF, then prime lattices from
its decomposition all have perfect HNF. In fact, Property 4 make it unwise to to
use unperfect HNF as secret keys (at least without prior study), as the information
would be leaked instantly and cannot be hidden with intersections or permutations
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as we explain in the next subsection.
Another basis type to consider besides diagonal dominant matrices for secret
key are ideal lattices.
Definition 20. Let Rf = Z[X]/ < f > a ring of polynomials over integers where
f is a monic polynomial of degree n, and consider the map Φf : X(i−1) → vi
where vi is the i−th standard vector of Zn and Xi the monomial of degree i
over Rf . We can then define a non-trivial ring structure over a particular set of
sublattices of Zn by mapping Rf to Zn via Φ. Suppose we take an ideal of Rf ,
namelyRf (p) =< p >with p ∈ Rf . We denoteL(p, f) the lattice ImΦf (Rf (p)).
For any lattice L, if there exists p, f such that L = L(p, f), we say L is an ideal
lattice.
Since we have an isomorphism of rings between L(p, f) and Rf (p), working
on one or the other is equivalent. In the literature, we usually see f = Xn − 1 or
f = Xn + 1.
Property 9. L(lcm(p, q)mod f, f) ⊆ L(p, f) ∩ L(q, f)
Proof. Let r = lcm(p, q) mod f . Hence r ∈< p > and r ∈< q >, therefore
Φf (r) ∈ L(p, f) and Φf (r) ∈ L(q, f) thus L(r, f) ⊆ L(p, f) ∩ L(q, f).
The equality happens quite often in experimentations. Intersecting two ideal
lattices with two different quotients bring results which are in general unknown to
the best of our knowledge.
Property 10. Let L1,L2 two integer lattices with co-prime determinants and ad-
mitting a basis with perfect HNF. Then L1 ∩L2 is an ideal lattice if and only if L1
and L2 are.
Proof. Recall the perfect HNF of an ideal lattice, which only uses one root and a
determinant (one visual representation can be seen on page 4 of [66]). If the HNF
of both L1 and L2 respect the root exponentiation structure of ideal lattices, the
same goes for L1 ∩ L2 as Theorem 2 shows. If not, then the root exponentiation
structure in the intersection is not respected either, while being a perfect HNF.
The intersection of an ideal lattice and a random lattice is therefore not an ideal
lattice.
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A.2 Permutations and perfectness
There is a way to greatly increase the chance to obtain an perfect HNF basis, and
it comes with a column permutation. The advantage of using permutations is to
be able to obtain perfect HNFs without changing the norms or the orthogonality
of any basis. If one needs a perfect HNF, it also drastically increases the chance
to get a secret key with perfect HNF rather than discarding it and generating an
new one. It is also used to hide various structures but this is not the main point here.
We note that Tourloupis et al. had a way to select matrices with a perfect HNF
with a 99% chance of success [75], however our aim is different here as we are try-
ing to transform a secret key into another one rather than discarding it completely.
Property 11. If M is a diagonal dominant matrix, then for σ ∈ Sn, L(σ(M)) still
admits a diagonal dominant basis with the same parameters as far as noise bound
and diagonal value is concerned.
This is trivial to see if we just permut the lines of the permuted columns on M .
Property 12. Let M be an integer matrix which admits a perfect HNF. Then if
a permutation σ ∈ Sn leaves the first column untouched, HNF (σ(M)) still has
perfect form.
What happens is just a permutation of the coefficients in the first column. It
allows us to reorder them as much as we see fit, which might lead one day to
interesting properties on any type of lattice. More noteworthy is the following
property:
Theorem 4. LetA be an integer matrix. If there exists σ′ ∈ Sn such thatHNF (σ′(A))
has perfect form, then there exists a column swap σ = (1 i) ∈ Sn with i ∈ [1, n]
such that HNF (σ(A)) has perfect form.
Proof. Suppose there is such a permutation σ′. Then we denote σ′(A) = A′
with HNF (A′) being perfect. Now, σ′ can be decomposed to X ◦ σ where σ =
(1 i), i ∈ [1, n] and X leaves the first column untouched. X−1 also leaves the first
column untouched, and therefore X−1(σ′(A)) = σ(A) also has perfect form.
This reduces the number of combinations to obtain perfect HNFs from n! to
1. The single permutation (1 n) is sufficient to check since if (1 i) transforms M
into a basis M ′ of an equivalent lattice L(M ′) admitting a perfect HNF basis, then
(i n) transforms M ′ into M ′′ still admitting a perfect HNF. However, for hiding
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certain type of basis, any element σ ∈ Sn can be used as a part of the secret key.
Also, we can easily identify some automatic failure cases, which allows us to
avoid computations of HNFs in guaranteed case of failure:
Property 13. • Let A,B,C denote three lattices such that A = B ∩ C. Then
for any column permutation σ ∈ Sn, σ(A) = σ(B) ∩ σ(C).
• Let L be an imperfect lattice, and let us take any decomposition into prime
lattices (as it might not be unique). Then, L is equivalent by permutation to
a perfect lattice if and only if there exists σ ∈ Sn such that every integer
overlattice in that decomposition is made perfect by σ and they all respect
towards each other the property 5.
• Let M be an integer matrix in HNF which is not perfect. Let i < n be the
biggest integer such that Sm(M, (i, n)) has perfect form. Then for every
σ = (1 a), a ∈ [1, i− 1], HNF (σ(M)) does not have perfect form.
The following test is made with random matrices with coefficients that varies
between -7 and 7. We then transform them into HNF and exclude every matrix who
already has a perfect HNF, only keeping the imperfect ones to try conversion on.
This is a test with 1000 matrices non-perfect HNF matrices on various dimensions.
Dimension 50 80 100 120 150 180 200 300
Sucess rate 0.756 0.726 0.741 0.748 0.744 0.749 0.728 0.737
Counting the ones that have already a perfect HNF, we believe the probability of
a random matrix with bounded entries to have a perfect HNF or being equivalent to
one by column permutation raises to over 80% (up from at most 40% without per-
mutation [69]). This is actually incredibly close to the 85% presence of co-cyclic
lattices among all lattices counted by Nguyen and Shparlinski [57] and used by
Gama and al for their average-case to worst-case proof for most randomly chosen
lattices [23].
The following property gives us an important case of non-convertible non-
perfect HNFs:
Property 14. Note A,B matrices in perfect Hermite Normal Form. Let C be the
Hermite Normal Form basis of the lattice L(A)∩LB. If C does not have a perfect
form (i.e A and B does not respect property 5/6 relative to each other), then for
any σ ∈ Sn, Φ(σ(C)) > 1.
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This is noticeable by looking at the prime decomposition and looking at the
prime collision. The colliding primes will never intersect into a matching lattice,
and despite the high success rate of permutations in transforming a non perfect
lattice in non-perfect form, no permutation (acting on the two matrices simultane-
ously) would change that.
Property 15. Let M be a perfect HNF basis of an ideal lattice. In general, with
σ ∈ Sn, L(σ(M)) is not an ideal lattice.
This is because permuting columns change the root exponentiation structure
present in the perfect HNF of an ideal lattice basis. This could prove useful to
hide ideal lattices structure, but we do not know whether the inverse permutation
is easily recoverable or not.
A.3 Generation algorithm and complexity
To make the following easier to read, we introduce the functions:
• HNF (M): given a matrix M , return its Hermite Normal Form.
• IsCoprime(a, b): returns true if a, b are co-prime, false otherwise.
• Prod(S): given a set S, returns the product of all elements of S.
• Det(M): returns the determinant of M .
• M1 cat M2: given M1,M2, concatenate them into a new matrix.
• Babai(M,v): Apply Babai’s nearest plane algorithm to v with the lattice
L(M). If M is HKZ-reduced it’s incredibly effective. Especially with a
diagonal dominant lattice.
The parameters are a family of primes Sp, a scaling factor f , a security param-
eter λ for the number of combinations, a dimension, and parameters (D, b) for
generating the diagonal dominant matrix. Of course, we have to check beforehand
that Sp is large enough to meet 2λ combinations but not too big to have a high
chance to respect equations (3).
Note that following Theorem 2 computing the HNF basis of the intersection of
two full rank n lattices L1,L2 with perfect HNF basis of coprime determinants d1
and d2 has only complexityO(n log(d1d2)) in time and in memory, as it is nothing
more than using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to reconstruct n integers. We
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believe this is faster in practice than computing Dual(Dual(L1) ∪Dual(L2)) to
obtain L1 ∩ L2 in our particular case.
The complexity is mostly the computation of the HNF and Babai’s Nearest
Plane algorithm, the rest are manipulations of integers that are linear in the di-
mension and polynomial in the determinant (GCD computations, multiplications).
Using Micciancio and Warinschi’s algorithm for obtaining HNF [52], the com-
plexity is O(n4polylog(M,n)) arithmetical operations, which can be improved in
practice using later works like [64], and Babai’s nearest plane algorithm is also
polynomial [5]. Trying to get a perfect HNF can appear to be costly in the while
loop, but in experimentations we have in average only one retry when using per-
mutations.
This goes in line with the probability of having two random numbers being
co-prime which is 6
π2
≈ 61% (first solved by Euler in 1735, see [31] for proof,
theorem 332, page 269 in 4th edition), and our experimental results with obtaining
a perfect HNF from permutations with over 80% (0.8×0.6 = 0.48). The probabil-
ity is slightly higher if we use the concatenated column c as a permutable column,
and we might even gain more in efficiency by reinitializing the permutable column
c instead of Sk−, even through it does not change much the overall complexity.
Another way to heuristically improve speed at the cost of memory in the generation
of Pkc is to save the transformation matrix T such that T ∗ Sk− = HNF (Sk−),
and using the first of row of T one can quickly find c such that (Tc)[1] is prime
to det(Sk−). In that case the extra computation due to Pk∗[1][1], Pk∗[1][2] not
being coprime become negligeable.
Now we have to explain why this algorithm works and outputs the correct result.
The first part is the part of the algorithm which has a note above "Ensuring the end
result is in perfect form". This is to ensure that the small square we complete with
Bézout coefficients can be reduced in perfect form. If those two columns are not
co-prime with det(Sk), then the final result cannot be reduced to an perfect form
(as reducing is using linear combinations), therefore we choose a column we will
ensure to be co-prime with det(Sk) and this guarantees the result.
The second part is to explain why the end result is still a diagonal dominant matrix
(at least with overwhelming probability). Suppose we have not used any permuta-
tion (if we used one the result is the same according to a property in the previous
section), and for simplicity we denote Pkc[1][2] = |det(Sk−)| = a, Pkc[1][1] =
b. Subtracting a vector by the other ones does not change the determinant. Let
us reduce l by the vectors of Skc (with Babai’s nearest plane algorithm, which
is the final step of the algorithm to compute Sk), and denote that reduced vector
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Input: Sp, min(Sp) > f > 1, λ, n > 1, (D, b)
Output: Sk, Pk
NbPrimes← 0;
while 2λ >
( |Sp|
NbPrimes
)
do
NbPrimes← NbPrimes+ 1
end
Pk∗ = [2, 2];
while IsCoprime(Pk∗[1][1], Pk∗[1][2]) do
Sk− ← DD matrix Sk− of dimension n− 1 with diagonal coefficent
D and noise b;
Skc ← Sk− cat (c, a column of n− 1 values bounded by b);
// new column position is 1
Pkc = HNF (Sk∗);
// Use permutations to raise chance of perfect HNF on
Sm(Pkc, (2, n))
if Pkc amputed of its first column is not a perfect HNF then
continue;
end
end
Find coefficients u, v such that uPkc[1][2] + vPkc[1][1] = 1;
// Ensuring the end result is in perfect form
if IsCoprime(f, Pkc[1][1]) then
Id← 1
else
Id← 2
end
DR ← 1,DSk ← 1;
// Choosing det(R)
foreach {p ∈ Sp , p|Pkc[1][Id]} do
remove p from Sp; NbPrimes← NbPrimes− 1; DR ← DRp;
end
while NbPrimes > 0 do
Remove p randomly from Sp; DR ← DRp;
NbPrimes← NbPrimes− 1;
end
// Choosing det(Sk)
DSk ← Prod(Sp);
// Using the scaling factor f to respect equation (3)
while DSk < DDet(Sk−) do
DSk ← DSkf
end
Y ← Line of n zeroes; Y [1]← uDSk ,Y [2]← −vDSk ;
Pk ← HNF(Pkc cat Y ) ∩ (random perfect HNF of determinant DR);
Sk ← Skc cat Babai(Skc,Y );
return Pk,Sk
Algorithm 3: Generating new GGH keys using diagonal dominant matrices
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l′. Because Sk− is diagonal dominant with diagonal coefficient d, reducing the
line l with Skc will reduce all its coefficients except the first to integers below
d, therefore l′[2] < d. We note Pkl
′
the square matrix (l′ cat Pkc). We know
det(Pkl
′
) = det(Pk). Now we look at the computation of det(Pkl
′
) develop-
ing over the first row l′ and naturally obtain det(Pk) = l′[1]a − l′[2]b. Since
a and det(Pk) are positive, l′[2] and b have the same sign if and only if l′[1] is
positive. Now because of equation (3), da < l′[1]a − l′[2]b < 2da therefore
d < l′[1] − l
′[2]b
a < 2d and since |b| < a with overwhelming probability (the op-
posite has never occured in experimentations) and |l′[2]| < d this forces l′[1] to be
positive and reasonably close to [d, 2d]. In practice it seems closer to 2d than d.
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